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Locke and Spinoza on the epistemic and motivational weaknesses of reason:
the Reasonableness of Christianity and the Theological-Political Treatise
Andrea Sangiacomo*
Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History of Philosophy, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
I cannot but approve your purpose in signifying your willingness to elucidate and moderate those pas-
sages in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus which have proved a stumbling block to readers. (Olden-
burg to Spinoza, 15 November 1675)
1. Spinoza and Locke against dogmatism and deism
One of the main polemical targets of Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise (published in 1670)
is “dogmatism”. According to Spinoza, dogmatism contends that “Scripture should be subject to
reason”.1 When a dogmatist interprets Holy Scripture, “if its literal sense is found to conﬂict with
reason, no matter how evident that may seem to be in itself, he insists it should then be construed
differently”.2 Dogmatism presupposes that natural reason is the ultimate authority in the domain
of moral truths and the doctrines of Holy Scripture itself are receivable only insofar as they agree
with natural reason. Spinoza strongly opposes dogmatism. He does not deny that the general
moral doctrines of Holy Scripture can be proved to be consistent with the teachings of natural
reason. However, in the Tractatus Spinoza extensively argues that reason alone is mostly
unable to allow common people to discover moral truth and even less able to motivate them to
act accordingly. As a result, the Tractatus defends the necessity to rely on Holy Scripture and posi-
tive religion to establish and consolidate moral practice in actual human communities.
By the end of the seventeenth century, a variety of different thinkers in England agreed on the
fact that positive religions may help transmit moral truths in certain contingent historical and
socio-political circumstances. Yet, they contended that unassisted natural reason could provide
(and in a more effective and universal way) the same content. This view downplays the role of
positive religions in guiding moral behaviours since natural reason alone could equally (if not
better) succeed in grounding an acceptable moral and political life. Despite their different
approaches, philosophers committed to this line of thought were usually labelled “deists”. John
Locke was sometimes associated with deism, especially because of the use that several desists
such as Toland and Collins made of the views articulated in Locke’s Essay.3 Yet, Locke
devotes the Reasonableness of Christianity (published in 1695) to ﬁght deism.4 In this later
work, Locke argues that unassisted natural reason would be unable not only to motivate but
also to access the fundamental moral truths necessary to ground moral and political life.
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In this paper, I argue that Locke’s strategy to attack deism closely followed the strategy that
Spinoza had already employed against dogmatism in the Tractatus. Although Spinoza has been
commonly associated with English deism and often portrayed as one of its main sources,5 and
Locke himself was sometimes charged with deism, a close comparison between Spinoza and
Locke’s arguments supports three important points.
First, by analysing how both Locke and Spinoza engaged in uncovering the epistemological
and motivational weaknesses of reason, my reading contributes to current efforts to re-think the
standard narrative of Enlightenment as a long paean to the power of reason over the passions.
Recent Spinoza scholarship has already begun to appreciate how Spinoza did not conceive of
reason as sufﬁcient by itself to rule human beings and restrain passions.6 The fact that Locke’s
arguments in the Reasonableness parallel Spinoza’s reveals that also in the seventeenth
century, the weaknesses of reason, rather than its “infallible power”,7 were the objects of
intense discussion. A closer examination of Locke and Spinoza’s arguments problematizes not
only Spinoza’s own commitment to the most “radical” and rationalist instances of the Enlighten-
ment,8 but also whether leading ﬁgures such as Spinoza and Locke actually ﬁt within this standard
narrative. If radical Enlightenment is characterized by a more or less explicit iconoclastic attitude
towards positive religions, Spinoza’s Tractatus and Locke’s Reasonableness argue on the con-
trary that positive religions are necessary to establish, consolidate and maintain moral practices
in actual human societies.
Second, pace the widespread association of Spinoza with English deism, Locke’s Reason-
ableness proves that Spinoza’s arguments in the Tractatus can be powerful weapons to ﬁght
deism itself. In fact, the deist position opposed by Locke can be regarded as a development of
the dogmatist position already attacked by Spinoza. Both Spinoza’s Tractatus and Locke’s
Reasonableness underscore the weaknesses of natural reason by arguing that reason is often
unable to discover moral truth, and surely unable to fully motivate common people to act accord-
ing to those truths. Nonetheless, this comparison also reveals that the main difference between the
two authors concerns their accounts of the role of Christ. Yet, I shall argue that Locke’s disagree-
ment with Spinoza on this point strengthens the main argument about the weaknesses of reason
that they share.
Third, the similarities between Locke and Spinoza’s views suggest that Spinoza’s Tractatus
could have been a likely source for Locke’s Reasonableness. The scholarship on Locke’s
direct relationship with Spinoza is surprisingly scarce.9 This is not due to the fact that Locke
was unaware of Spinoza’s position. It is true that Locke once claimed that he is “not so well
read in Hobbes or Spinoza, as to be able to say what were their Opinions”, yet we should not
forget that Locke wrote this line in the context of a controversy with the Bishop of Worcester
in order to dismiss any possible association with Spinoza.10 Actually, Locke owned all of Spino-
za’s available works (Principle of Cartesian Philosophy, Theological-Political Treatise and the
Opera Posthuma), and he even quoted Spinoza’s Tractatus at least once, in his notes on James
Bible.11 This provides evidence that it is probable that Locke was directly acquainted with Spi-
noza’s works and ideas. My analysis of Locke’s argument in the Reasonableness suggests that in
developing his analysis of the New Testament and his interpretation of the role of positive religion
for moral practice, Locke could have found in Spinoza’s Tractatus important support for his own
thesis.
Before delving into the details of my discussion, I shall make two disclaimers concerning my
approach to Locke and Spinoza’s works and thought. First, I consider Locke’s Reasonableness
and Spinoza’s Tractatus as standalone works that deserve to be discussed in their own right.
Locke’s Essay and Spinoza’s Ethics are usually considered the most representative works of
their respective authors. Yet, in the Reasonableness Locke seems quite far from the optimism
of the Essay, which is embedded in his famous statement according to which “Morality is
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capable of Demonstration, as well as Mathematicks.”12 As I shall argue, in the Reasonableness
Locke stresses that even if this demonstration would be possible, it would have arguably little
impact on moral behaviours. In fact, it has even been suggested that there might be a signiﬁcant
evolution in Locke’s moral thought between the Essay and the Reasonableness.13 Although the
issue of the evolution of Locke’s thought falls largely beyond the limits of this paper, I contend
that an examination of Locke’s Reasonableness considered in itself is preliminarily required for
any further assessment of the relationship between the Reasonableness and Essay.14
This consideration is even more appropriate in the case of Spinoza’s Tractatus, which was
initiated in 1665 and published in 1670. This means that Spinoza began to work on the Tractatus
when he had achieved only on a ﬁrst draft of the Ethics (seemingly very different from its last
version), and he concluded the Tractatus ﬁve years before the ﬁnal version of the Ethics was com-
pleted in 1675.15 Moreover, in the Tractatus Spinoza presents almost none of his most controver-
sial metaphysical claims (such as substance monism and his denial of freedom of will) that made
the Ethics so indigestible for his contemporaries. Even if Locke had access to both works, any
strong disagreement on the metaphysical tenets on which the Ethics is based would not have pre-
vented a close reading and reworking of the Tractatus, in which these tenets do not play any
essential role. As a result, considering Locke’s position from the point of view of the Tractatus
allows to put in parenthesis the most controversial points of disagreement concerning metaphys-
ical matters between the two authors.
My second disclaimer is that my comparison does not aim to delve into the metaphysical and
anthropological views behind the positions defended by Locke and Spinoza in the Reasonableness
and in the Tractatus. This is because neither in Spinoza’s Tractatus nor in Locke’s Reasonableness
is there any trace of detailed discussions about the nature of reason and passions. Instead, both
authors rely on a common understanding of these notions shared with their intended audiences,
and they consider such a common understanding sufﬁcient to deal with the matters they discuss.
According to this common understanding, reason is the human capability to grasp a kind of univer-
sally accessible knowledge that entails a form of certitude that makes it immutable. On the contrary,
imagination and passions are commonly understood as related to the body and rooted in sensation.
As such, imagination and passions are generally more tied to individual idiosyncrasies and speciﬁc
circumstances, and usually more vividly perceived than rational ideas. A full-blown explanation of
why reason and passions work precisely as Spinoza and Locke depict would surely require a deeper
philosophical analysis (which may underlie the divergences between their respective views on the
subject). Yet, neither Spinoza nor Locke envisages that such an analysis would be necessary to
advance the views that they defend in the Tractatus and Reasonableness.
In Section 2, I present Locke’s own argument concerning the weaknesses of reason in the
Reasonableness by dealing ﬁrst with the epistemic and then with the motivational side of this
issue. In Section 3, I present Spinoza’s argument as it appears in the Tractatus by following
the same order and providing evidence that, in fact, Spinoza aimed at establishing the same
point made by Locke by using a very similar argumentative strategy. In Section 4, I discuss
how Spinoza’s account of Christ constitutes the only signiﬁcant difference with regard to
Locke’s position. While Spinoza presents Christ as a “preacher of natural law”, Locke portrays
him as a King and a Prophet. Nonetheless, I argue that in this way Locke is in a better position
than Spinoza to secure the general claim concerning the weaknesses of reason to which they both
subscribe.
2. Locke on the weaknesses of reason
Locke’s Reasonableness is intended to answer a precise query concerning how to interpret the
role of Christ.16 Locke’s main target is the position defended by those who “thought there was
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no Redemption necessary, [… ] and so made Jesus Christ nothing but the Restorer and Preacher
of pure Natural Religion”.17 Locke’s strategy against them consists in arguing that the faith in
Christ is necessary to obtain Redemption because natural reason alone cannot provide it. The
largest part of Locke’s Reasonableness (Chapters 3–11) is thus devoted to establish the exact
content of the faith required for salvation, while Chapter 14 presents the argument to dismiss
the possibility that natural reason alone might be sufﬁcient to grasp natural law and
oblige human beings to respect it as a law. I will deal with these two aspects of Locke’s argument
in turn.
In Chapter 3, Locke draws a distinction between the “law of works” and the “law of faith”.
The law of works is “that Law, which requires perfect Obedience, without any remission or abate-
ment; So that by that Law a man cannot be Just, or justiﬁed without an exact performance of every
tittle”.18 This law is composed of two parts, namely, the positive law of Moses (which includes
ceremonies and other positive laws adapted to the ancient Hebrew State), and the law of nature.19
Indeed, “under the Law of Works is comprehended also the Law of Nature, knowable by Reason,
as well as the Law given byMoses”.20 The law of works provides a strict standard of rightness and
salvation, which can follow only from a strict observance and obedience of such a law.
Nonetheless, through the law of faith we are “allowed to supply the defect of full Obedience;
and so the Believers are admitted to Life and Immortality as if they were Righteous”.21 When
perfect obedience to the law of work is not achieved, faith counts instead of it.22 The immediate
problem raised by the introduction of law of faith consists in determining the exact content of this
faith. Because in the New Testament God might require some additional article of faith that was
not already established in the Ancient Testament, Locke claims that
we must therefore examine and see what God requires us to believe now under the Revelation of the
Gospel: For the belief of one invisible, Eternal, Omnipotent God, maker of Heaven and Earth, etc. was
required before, as well as now.23
In the subsequent chapters, Locke establishes with a detailed examination of the New Testament
that the new article of faith is the belief that “Jesus is the Messiah.”24 Believing that “Jesus is the
Messiah” is not an alternative to the practice of the law of works. Rather the law of faith is
intended to support in a better way the practice prescribed by the law of works, especially for
human beings intrinsically weak and inconstant.
In Chapter 14, Locke claims that the law of nature (entailed in the law of works) cannot be
grasped or enforced by unassisted reason (i.e., without the help of Christ). As he claims: “too
hard a task for unassisted Reason to establish Morality, in all its parts, upon its true foundations;
with a clear and convincing light”.25 To support this point, Locke underscores the weaknesses of
reason in both providing access to the content of the law of nature and motivating human beings to
act in accordance with it. The faith in Christ turns out to be necessary in order to obtain salvation
since human beings are unable to achieve salvation if judged on the basis of the law of works only.
Locke’s argument is articulated into two points, one epistemological (i.e., grasping the content of
law of nature) and the other motivational (i.e., oblige human beings to respect such a law). I will
deal with each of them in turn.
Concerning the epistemological point, Locke explains that:
Though the Works of Nature, in every part of them, sufﬁciently Evidence a Deity; Yet the World made
so little use of their Reason, that they saw him not; Where even by the impressions of himself he was
easie to be found. Sense and Lust blinded their minds in some; And a careless Inadvertency in others;
And fearful Apprehensions in most (who either believed there were, or could not but suspect there
might be, Superior unknown Beings) gave them up into the hands of their Priests, to ﬁll their
Heads with false Notions of the Deity, and their Worship with foolish Rites, as they pleased [… ].
480 A. SANGIACOMO
Nor could any help be had or hoped for from Reason; which could not be heard, and was judged to
have nothing to do in the case.26
Locke does not argue that reason is ineffective because it is somehow corrupted.27 Actually,
Locke wants to warrant that reason could have access to natural law at least de jure (i.e., it would
have been possible in principle), since “God had, by the Light of Reason, revealed to all Mankind,
who would make use of that Light, that he was Good and Merciful.”28 Yet, Locke insists on the de
facto (i.e., looking at how things actually turned out in human history) inability of reason to
provide access to the content of the law of nature. The power of the passions (“Sense and Lust
blinded their minds in some; And a careless Inadvertency in others; And fearful Apprehensions
in most”) explains why human beings usually turn away from it, and priests are successful in
establishing their irrational superstitions. Moreover, the great majority of mankind is unprepared
to undertake the long and difﬁcult process of deduction that reason requires in order to establish
any conclusion on rational and self-evident premises.29 Human trust in the innate capacity of our
understanding to bring about knowledge without any external help is nothing but the result of an
illusion:
Nothing seems hard to our Understandings, that is once known; And because what we see we see with
our own Eyes, we are apt to over-look or forget the help we had from others, who shewed it us, and
ﬁrst made us see it.30
To these epistemic limitations, Locke adds a further concern that has more speciﬁcally to do
with the capacity for unassisted reason to motivate to act in accordance with the natural law. The
ﬁrst step of Locke’s argument consists in addressing the traditional intellectualist view according
to which knowledge of the good would be sufﬁcient to motivate someone to act in accordance
with it, and thus sinful actions result from ignorance. Locke does not dismiss the intellectualist
premise as such, but argues that, as a matter of fact, nobody before Christ had a sufﬁciently com-
plete knowledge of moral law, provided by a complete system of morality, and deduced from self-
evident premises on the basis of reason alone. As Locke notices:
Experience shews that the knowledge of Morality by meer natural light, (how agreeable soever it be to
it) makes but slow progress, and little advance in the World. And the reason of it is not hard to be
found in Men’s Necessities, Passions, Vices, and mistaken Interests; which turn their thoughts
another way.31
On the one hand, this claim provides further support for the acknowledgement of the epistemic
weakness of unassisted reason. On the other hand, it derives from this epistemic weakness a moti-
vational weakness, since (Locke’s argument goes) imperfect knowledge cannot have full motiva-
tional force.
Against Locke’s claim that unassisted reason is unable to provide a complete system of mor-
ality, one might object that moral philosophers since antiquity did in fact provide several useful
accounts of moral laws on the basis of reason alone. However, Locke responds to this objection
that (as a matter of fact) nobody before Christ was able to deduce a complete system of morality,
and this failure compromises the “authority” that philosophers and wise men of antiquity could
claim to present their own prescriptions as proper laws:
[T]hese incoherent apophthegms of Philosophers, and wise Men; however excellent in themselves,
and well intended by them; could never make a Morality, whereof the World could be convinced,
could never rise up to the force of a Law that Mankind could with certainty depend on. Whatsoever
should thus be universally useful, as a standard to which Men should conform their Manners, must
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have its Authority either from Reason or Revelation. [… ] He that any one will pretend to set up in this
kind, and have his Rules pass for authentique directions; must shew, that either he builds his Doctrine
upon Principles of Reason, self-evident in themselves; and deduces all the parts of it from thence, by
clear and evident demonstration: Or must shew his Commission from Heaven.32
Locke’s point seems to be that we must avoid a kind of rationalistic enthusiasm that would
drive us to take as a dictate of universal reason what is nothing but the result of personal specu-
lations of speciﬁc philosophers and wise men. Although they can grasp some part of the law of
nature, we have no reason to take their overall views as an actual presentation of the whole law of
nature. According to Locke, history testiﬁes that unassisted reason provided only scattered
insights into the law of nature. Because this knowledge remained always incomplete, it never
acquired full motivational force, and it never had sufﬁcient authority to establish philosophical
maxims as a proper universal moral code.33
Moreover, even assuming that philosophy could have produced such a perfect system of mor-
ality deduced by reason alone, Locke contends that this would have still been ineffective since the
great majority of human beings would be unable to truly grasp the content of the law conveyed
and demonstrated through merely rational arguments:
Philosophy seemed to have spent its strength, and done its utmost; Or if it should have gone farther, as
we see it did not, and from undenyable Principles given us Ethicks in a Science like Mathematicks in
every part demonstrable, this yet would not have been so effectual to man in this imperfect state, nor
proper for the Cure. The greatest part of mankind want leisure or capacity for Demonstration; nor can
they carry a train of Proofs; which in that way they must always depend upon for Conviction, and
cannot be required to assent to till they see the Demonstration. Wherever they stick, the Teachers
are always put upon Proof, and must clear the Doubt by a Thread of coherent deductions from the
ﬁrst Principle, how long, or how intricate soever that be. And you may as soon hope to have all
the Day-Labourers and Tradesmen, the Spinsters and Dairy Maids perfect Mathematicians, as to
have them perfect in Ethicks this way. Hearing plain Commands, is the sure and only course to
bring them to Obedience and Practice. The greatest part cannot know, and therefore they must
believe.34
The epistemic weakness of reason also reinforces Locke’s claim concerning the motivational
weakness of reason. In fact, people who are unable to fully grasp rational demonstrations will also
lack the motivation to act on the basis of them.
If the law of nature cannot be enforced by unassisted reason alone, it has to be sanctioned by a
different kind of authority, which is not provided by reason itself but by religious revelation. This
was Christ’s role indeed:
Such a Law of Morality, Jesus Christ hath given us in the New Testament; But by the latter of these
ways, by Revelation. We have from him a full and sufﬁcient Rule for our direction; And conformable
to that of Reason. But the truth and obligation of its Precepts have their force, and are put past doubt to
us, by the evidence of his Mission [… ]. HereMorality has a sure Standard, that Revelation vouches,
and Reason cannot gainsay, nor question; but both together witness to come from God the great Law-
maker.35
Christ’s revelation is necessary for our salvation because unassisted reason is unable to both
provide access to the law of nature and oblige human beings to respect it. This is why Locke
argues that the way in which Christ taught his “Law of Morality” has little to do pure rational
argumentation. As already explained, “the greatest part cannot know, and therefore they must
believe”.36 Yet, teaching moral duties by appealing to reason alone “would be thought proper
only for a few, who had much Leisure, improved Understandings, and were used to abstract Rea-
sonings”.37 As a consequence, although the content of the law taught and spread by Christ is fully
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consistent with reason’s dictates, he taught it by using a completely different method, which was
based on experience, examples and miracles. According to Locke,
To one who is once perswaded that Jesus Christ was sent by God to be a King, and a Saviour of those
who do believe in him; All his Commands become Principles: There needs no other Proof for the truth
of what he says, but that he said it.38
This is how the law of faith operates, namely, by granting salvation on the basis of the simple faith
in Christ’s authority, independent of whether one is able to grasp the ultimate rational foundation
of the norms that Christ prescribes.
It is important to note that in the Reasonableness Locke does not rule out the possibility that,
in principle, a purely rational grasp of the natural law might provide a sufﬁcient motivational force
to oblige human beings. Arguably, a perfectly rational and wise human being would be bound to
the law of nature only by her rational understanding of it. However, Locke raises serious doubts
about the fact that such a clear grasp of the natural law ever occurred in human history. As a result,
the possibility of a purely rational ground of obligation remains a merely abstract possibility. By
the end of Chapter 14, Locke reinforces this point by arguing that Christ’s revelation has speciﬁc
advantages over the effort of unassisted reason because it does not try to motivate human beings
by appealing to their rationality, but rather by exploiting their hedonist nature.39 Locke observes
that:
Virtue and Prosperity, do not often accompany one another; And therefore Virtue seldom had many
Followers. And ‘tis no wonder She prevailed not much in a State, where the Inconveniencies that
attended her were visible, and at hand; And the Rewards doubtful, and at a distance. Mankind,
who are and must be allowed to pursue their Happiness; Nay, cannot be hindred; Could not but
think themselves excused from a strict observation of Rules, which appeared so little to consist
with their chief End, Happiness; Whilst they kept them from the enjoyments of the Life; And they
had little evidence and security of another.40
Things dramatically changed with Christ because he established the belief in the existence of
an afterlife, in which human beings will be eternally rewarded or punished for their obedience to
the law:
How hath this one truth changed the Nature of things in the World, and given the advantage to Piety
over all that could tempt or deter Men from it? The Philosophers indeed shewed the beauty of Virtue:
They set her off so as drew Mens Eyes and approbation to her: But leaving her unendowed, very few
were willing to espouse her. The generality could not refuse her their esteem and commendation; But
still turned their Backs on her and forsook her, as a match not for their turn. But now there being put
into the Scales, on her side, An exceeding and immortal weight of Glory; Interest is come about to her;
And Virtue now is visibly the most enriching purchase, and by much the best bargain.41
According to Locke, “Upon this foundation, and upon this only, Morality stands ﬁrm, and
may defy all competition.”42 Appealing to the self-rewarding practice of virtue might have
some impact on perfectly rational creatures or scattered wise men, but it can scarcely have any
inﬂuence on the majority of human beings, who are mainly driven by passions and always
seeking their own happiness. By convincingly defending the belief in an afterlife in which
virtue will be rewarded and vice will be punished, Christ adds a strong hedonist motivational
component to his commands that will deﬁnitely move human beings to act in accordance with
them. In fact, for the majority of mankind, this powerful hedonist motivational element is
much more eloquent than any other rational argument.
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To summarize, the reasonableness of Christ’s message can be proved a posteriori through ade-
quate reﬂection on the content of the law enforced by Christ, and this proof would offer further
support to the fact that we ought to believe and obey Christ.43 Nonetheless, unassisted reason is
not able to provide us with a complete and adequate access to the content of the law of nature in
the ﬁrst place. As a consequence, unassisted reason does not have sufﬁcient authority to really
motivate human beings to act in accordance with it. In the next section, I shall prove that
Locke’s way of stressing the weaknesses of reason in moral practice is analogous to that
already developed by Spinoza in his Tractatus.
3. Spinoza on the weaknesses of reason
In the Tractatus, Spinoza argues for two important limitations of human rationality. From an epis-
temological point of view, Spinoza admits that (in principle, i.e., de jure) reason could give to
human beings direct access to moral law, but he also argues that (looking at what actually hap-
pened in history, i.e., de facto) the majority of human beings can hardly get acquainted with
this moral law through the use of reason alone. From a motivational point of view, although
Spinoza does not deny that a perfectly rational human being could be bound by reason alone
to act rightfully, he argues that given that human beings are mostly driven by their passions,
only an adequate manipulation of human passions can have enough motivational force to per-
suade a group of people to respect certain laws. I shall discuss these two points in turn.
Spinoza develops the epistemological point by advancing two claims: ﬁrst, Holy Scripture
contains a “natural divine law” accessible (de jure) through reason alone; second, the majority
of mankind is mostly unable to get acquainted with this natural divine law and, for this reason,
“prophetic divine law” is necessary. Concerning natural divine law, Spinoza identiﬁes it with
the knowledge and love of God:
This then is what our highest good and happiness is, the knowledge and love of God. Therefore the
means required by this end of all human actions, which is God himself so far as his idea is in us, may
be called the commands of God, because they are prescribed to us, as it were, by God himself so far as
he exists in our minds, and therefore the rule of life [ratio vivendi] which looks to this end is best
called the divine law.44
This “natural” divine law is universal, does not require beliefs in narratives or ceremonies, and
is rewarding in itself.45 Natural divine law does not require considering God as a legislator since it
simply prescribes the knowledge and love of God as our supreme good and happiness.46 Accord-
ing to Spinoza, there are traces of this natural divine law in Holy Scripture itself, especially in
Salomon’s Proverbs.47 This means that natural divine law can be grasped by human reason,
and it is part of religious revelation. However, Spinoza’s overall view is that grasping natural
divine law through reason alone is extremely difﬁcult for the great majority of human beings:
the carnal man [homo carnalis] however cannot understand this; it seems foolish to him because he
has too meagre a knowledge of God, and he ﬁnds nothing in this highest good that he can touch or eat
or that makes any impression on the ﬂesh in which he takes so much pleasure, for knowledge of God
consists in philosophical reasoning alone and pure thought.48
Luckily, Holy Scripture contains not only natural divine law, but also prophetic divine law
that speaks more clearly to the “carnal man”. Prophetic divine law is different from natural
divine law because it does not rely on an intellectual knowledge of God (neither on the part of
prophets nor on the part of their audience), and it is rather adapted to prejudices and characters
of different times, places and socio-political conditions. Nonetheless, prophetic divine law is
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consistent with natural divine law. Prophetic divine law is concerned mainly to inculcate obedi-
ence towards the prophetic revealed law, but the content of this law has nothing mysterious since
“the entire Law consists in just one thing, namely love of one’s neighbour. No one can deny that
the person who loves his neighbour as himself by God’s command, is truly obedient and blessed
according to the Law”.49 It could be hardly argued that the love of one’s neighbour is not consist-
ent with natural divine law grasped through reason alone.50 From this point of view, Holy Scrip-
ture really contains true moral teachings (vera documenta moralia)51 that are universal in scope
and perfectly reasonable in their goals while narratives, ceremonies and all the other accessory
parts of Holy Scripture are intended only to adapt and inculcate obedience to the divine law in
different groups of people.52
Locke identiﬁed the law taught in the Ancient Testament with the law of works, which
includes the positive prophetic law and the law of nature.53 Spinoza similarly claims that the
Ancient Testament contains both natural divine law and the prophetic divine law. Both Locke
and Spinoza grant that, in principle, natural divine law is accessible to reason alone. Yet, they
both stress that, as a matter of fact, the great majority of mankind did not grasp it in this way.
As a result, both stress that moral law is more effectively enforced through an accurate manipu-
lation of imagination and passions (e.g., fear, hope, devotion and wonder).54
Locke claims that the epistemic weakness of reason and the inability of the great majority of
mankind to master rational argumentation make the appeal to Revelation necessary to provide
access to the content of natural law.55 In an analogous vein, Spinoza contends that:
[A] long chain of linked inferences is required, to come to ﬁrm conclusions from basic ideas alone.
Furthermore, this requires great caution and perspicacity and supreme mental discipline, qualities
only seldom met with among human beings. People prefer to be taught by experience than to
deduce all their ideas from a few premises and connect these together. Consequently, where
someone seeks to teach a whole nation, not to speak of the entire human race, and wants to be under-
stood by everybody, he must substantiate his points by experience alone and thoroughly adapt his
arguments and the deﬁnitions of his teaching to the capacity of the common people (the majority
of mankind), and not make a chain of inferences or advance deﬁnitions linking his arguments
together.56
Like Locke, Spinoza also does not claim that human beings are deprived of reason or that
reason, being somehow corrupted, cannot attain the knowledge of truth and moral law. Rather,
he claims that because “the mind is very often so preoccupied with greed, glory, jealousy,
anger, etc., that there is no room for reason”, true virtue is better taught through experience. Bib-
lical prophets, although scarcely equipped with rational skills and truly ignorant in many specu-
lative matters,57 “had a unique and extraordinary virtue, and cultivated piety with a unique
constancy of purpose”.58 Prophets enforce a practice ultimately compatible with the main pre-
scriptions of reason and natural divine law, although they base it on a completely different
ground, that is, an appropriate manipulation of imagination and passions. In this way, they
provide a paradigmatic example of how the practice of virtue can be supported without relying
on reason alone.
Given Spinoza’s portrait of the “carnal man” and his inability to naturally grasp natural divine
law, Holy Scripture is necessary to attain salvation, at least for the great majority of mankind:
I must emphasize very strongly here, although I have mentioned it before, the usefulness and necessity
of Holy Scripture or revelation, which I hold to be very great. For given that we cannot discern by the
natural light alone that simple obedience is the path to salvation, and revelation alone teaches us that it
comes from a singular grace of God which we cannot acquire by reason, it follows that Scripture has
brought great consolation to mortal men. Everyone without exception can obey, not merely the very
few – very few, that is, in comparison with the whole human race – who acquire the habit of virtue
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by the guidance of reason alone. Hence, if we did not possess this testimony of Scripture, we would
have to consider the salvation of almost all men to be in doubt.59
As Locke claims that “the greatest part cannot know, and therefore they must believe”,60
Spinoza also stresses that “[e]veryone without exception can obey, not merely the very few [
… ] who acquire the habit of virtue by the guidance of reason alone”.61 Given the epistemic weak-
ness of reason alone, prophetic divine law is necessary to let people know what is the right moral
and political rule of life they should adopt.
Prophetic divine law is crucially important also to successfully motivate human beings and
create a sufﬁcient obligation towards moral law. Spinoza is fully aware that “if human beings
were so constituted by nature that they desired nothing but what true reason points them to,
society would surely need no laws”.62 In general, Spinoza does not deny that reason alone
might have enough motivational force to bind a wise man to act in accordance with natural
divine law.63 However, he also recognizes this possibility as an exception rather than as a rule:
it is far from being the case that everyone can easily be led by the sole guidance of reason. For every-
one is guided by their own pleasure, and the mind is very often so preoccupied with greed, glory, jea-
lousy, anger, etc., that there is no room for reason.64
Fostering obedience is the main business of Holy Scripture, but for the great majority of
people reason does not have enough motivational force to establish obedience, which thus
follows only from an appropriate use of imagination and passions. Prophetic divine law is a con-
venient pedagogical instrument useful not only for teaching the ﬁrst rudiments of morality to
common people, but also to motivate them to act accordingly.65
Spinoza adamantly denies that reason alone could have any weight in obliging the majority of
mankind. In the state of nature “each person’s natural right therefore is determined not by sound
reason but by desire and power”.66 This implies that the instauration of the civil State presupposes
a “person possessing the sovereign power to compel all men by force and restrain them by fear of
the supreme penalty which all men universally fear, has sovereign right over all men”.67 Spinoza
also explains that “laws should be so drawn up that people are restrained less by fear than hope of
something good which they very much desire; for in this way everybody will do his duty willingly
[cupide suum ofﬁcium faciet]”.68 Indeed, Moses “took great care to ensure that the people would
do its duty willingly and not through fear”.69 From this picture it emerges that Spinoza endorses,
as Locke, a hedonist account of moral motivation, and considers unrealistic that reason alone can
create sufﬁcient obligation to moral law.70
To summarize, the similarities between Locke and Spinoza’s views that have emerged so far
are the following. Both Spinoza and Locke do not accept the theological claim that reason would
have been corrupted by Adam’s fall, and they both claim that natural light is de jure present and
uncorrupted in human beings. However, they both deny that de facto reason alone is sufﬁcient to
let the majority of human beings know the content of the law of nature. Moreover, they both
contend that even admitting a rational knowledge of our duty, reason alone is often unable to
produce obligation since it does not have sufﬁcient motivational force to overcome the force
of appetites and passions by which human beings are usually driven. Thus, they both consider
Holy Scripture a necessary means to oblige (common people at least) to respect natural law on
the basis of hedonist motivations.
Nonetheless, there is also a major difference between Spinoza and Locke’s views that con-
cerns the role of Christ. This difference seems not only to widen the gulf between the two
authors but also to undermine Spinoza’s own argument concerning the weaknesses of reason.
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4. Christ between Spinoza and Locke
Locke identiﬁes the law of faithwith the belief in the fact that “Jesus is the Messiah.” This belief is
not intended to increase our theoretical knowledge, but rather as a remedy to our ignorance and
imperfect obedience. Believing in Christ is a practical attitude that will allow the believers to act
in accordance with the law prescribed by Christ himself (whose content is consistent with the law
of works, and thus, with the law of nature). Spinoza defends a similar view insofar as he also
claims that faith is primarily a practical attitude since it consists in holding those beliefs that
are necessary to support and enforce certain behaviours consistent with the prophetic divine
law.71 According to Spinoza, there are seven “pious” dogmas absolutely necessary to the practice
of obedience, namely, that God exists, that he is one, everywhere present, supremely powerful, pre-
scribing love and justice, able to save those who will follow his law and merciful with those who
repentant their sins. Although Spinoza does not include the belief that “Christ is the Messiah”
among these seven dogmas, he does include in the seventh that “who ﬁrmly believes that God
forgives men’s sins with the mercy and grace with which he directs all things and is more fully
inspired with the love of God for this reason, truly knows Christ according to the spirit”.72
Nonetheless, Spinoza seems to portray Christ as an exceptional ﬁgure. This exceptionality
does not depend on any novelties introduced by Christ’s doctrines, but only on the way in
which he presented the already known law. Spinoza does not present Christ as bringing a new
“law of faith”, and rather he tends to see the contents of Christ’s preaching in complete continuity
with the content of prophetic divine law (i.e., what Locke calls law of works). Spinoza portrays
Christ as someone “to whom the decrees of God which guide men to salvation were revealed not
by words or visions but directly”.73 Indeed, “if Moses spoke with God face to face as a man with
his friend (that is, through the mediation of two bodies), Christ communicated with God from
mind to mind”.74 Therefore,
Christ was not so much a prophet as the mouth-piece of God. [… ] Christ therefore understood
revealed things truly and adequately. Hence if he sometimes prescribed them as laws, he did so
because of the ignorance and obstinacy of the people.75
In Spinoza’s view, the novelty of Christ consists only in his perfectly rational grasp of the natural
divine law and in his effort to teach such a law on the basis of reason alone (at least, as much as
possible). Spinoza emphasizes that:
Christ, as I said, was sent not to conserve a commonwealth and institute laws, but to teach the uni-
versal law alone. Hence, we readily understand that Christ did not abolish the Law of Moses at all,
since he did not intend to introduce any new laws into the state. His overriding concern was to
offer moral teaching, and to distinguish it from the laws of the state.76
Scholars tend to read Spinoza as committed to presenting Christ as a “Preacher of pure Natural
Religion” (to use Locke’s phrasing), or rather (to use Alexandre Matheron’s expression) “as a Spi-
nozist philosopher”.77 Yet, two important aspects of Spinoza’s position usually do not receive suf-
ﬁcient attention.
First, Spinoza has to maintain that there is just one consistent moral message taught by Holy
Scripture. This claim is pivotal to Spinoza’s project of showing that the Bible contains true moral
doctrines. The fact that Christ did not intend to abolish the law of Moses reinforces the idea that
the “universal law” taught by Christ was in fact consistent with the prophetic law, or rather the
core of natural divine law entailed by it. Christ’s teachings provide further support for the
claim that there is a rational (or at least reasonable) ground in prophetic divine law, which
Christ aims to uncover.78
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Second, by stressing the role of Christ as a mere preacher of universal law, Spinoza dismisses
the political role of Christ. Distinct from the prophets who already played a crucial role in foster-
ing or threatening the solidity of the Hebrew State, Christ and his Apostles were only private men,
teaching as doctors and not aiming at establishing or undermining any political power. This
implies that any political claim based upon Christ’s authority has to be considered illegitimate.
Spinoza’s portrait of Christ aims at undermining the political vindications of seventeenth-
century Christian sects (e.g., Calvinists) by showing that Christ never presented himself as a
King or, like ancient prophets, as a political ruler, and thus Christianity has little to do with the
authority and role of the political Sovereign.79 Spinoza’s own thesis, according to which only
the political Sovereign possesses the right in matter of religion, receives further support from
the example of Christ himself, who always respected the right of the established political
authority.80
Nonetheless, Spinoza’s account of Christ raises two major problems. The ﬁrst concerns Chris-
tian readers rather than Spinoza himself. The Tractatus leaves few doubts about the necessity of
Christ’s revelation. Although Christ represented an excellent and unique model of virtue, his func-
tion seems only that of conﬁrming what everyone already knew from the Ancient Testament, that
is, that Holy Scripture recommends the knowledge of God as our supreme good. On this basis, it
would be hard to argue for any necessity of Christ’s coming, and in fact establishing this necessity
does not ﬁgure among Spinoza’s main goals in the Tractatus. Moreover, insofar as Christ’s
message is reducible to the dictates of reasons, in principle every fully rational human being
could grasp the same doctrines without necessarily relying on the intermediation of Christ.81
The second problem threatens Spinoza’s own project insofar as Christ’s example risks
showing either too much or too little. As noticed in the previous section, Spinoza contends
that natural reason alone is rarely able to reveal the true content of moral law and surely
cannot produce any sufﬁcient obligation for common people. Spinoza’s account of how political
obligation is established, and how passions should be used for this purpose, rests on this point.82
However, Christ might appear as “the Restorer and Preacher of pure Natural Religion”, which
seems to rule out any further needs for prophetic revelation and institutionalized religions.83
Arguably, from Spinoza’s own point of view, Christ would be only the exception that conﬁrms
the rule according to which natural reason alone is insufﬁcient to bring common people
towards beatitude. Yet, once it is admitted that Christ made natural divine law accessible to every-
one, it might be possible to argue that now everyone could know the dictates of natural religion
and just follow them, without any further need to afﬁliate with positive religions. Actually,
Spinoza would reply that the same argument (i.e., the power of our passions) that reveals the
weakness of reason to effectively grasp and motivate common people to act in accordance
with natural divine law also explains why Christ’s case must remain the sole exception. From Spi-
noza’s portrait of Christ it does not follow that everyone could imitate him in freeing himself from
the power of passions and attaining a pure rational knowledge of God and virtue. However, if this
is the case, then it is no longer clear what the efﬁcacy of Christ’s teachings could be (if any), given
the passionate nature of human beings and Spinoza’s argument concerning the weakness of
merely rational doctrines to produce a sufﬁciently strong motivation to act in accordance with
moral law.
From Locke’s point of view, the two abovementioned problems embedded in Spinoza’s
account of Christ constitute serious threats. Locke agrees with Spinoza in recognizing that the
content of the law preached by Christ is consistent with the law of works contained in the
Ancient Testament, and thus it entails the law of nature as well. However, by presenting Christ
as a “Restorer and Preacher of pure Natural Religion”, Spinoza’s account suggests that Christ’s
coming was not strictly necessary. In fact, in Spinoza’s view, the prophets already exercised
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the role that Locke would like to attribute to Christ alone in both providing access to the content of
the moral law and motivating human beings to act in accordance with it.84
Spinoza and Locke agree on the fact that some non-rational means is necessary for (the
majority of) human beings to grasp the content of the moral law and be motivated to act in accord-
ance with it. Spinoza identiﬁes this means with prophetic divine law while Locke identiﬁes it with
the law of faith established by Christ. Given Locke’s portrait of Christ, Spinoza would agree that if
we assume (as Locke does) that Christ acted like the prophets of the Ancient Testament, then in
this sense his coming might have been necessary (as the preaching of any other prophet was). Yet,
Spinoza would notice that Locke’s account of Christ does not really save the necessity of Christ’s
coming as such, since it does not make Christ’s role signiﬁcantly different from that of any other
prophets of the Ancient Testament. Against Locke, Spinoza would maintain that what makes
Christ exceptional is the way in which he grasped the content of the law he taught, and only
because he grasped it through reason alone he was also able to teach universally to all
mankind, and not just to the Hebrew as other prophets did.
However, this line of thought would not convince Locke since it is ultimately inconsistent
with the argument concerning the weaknesses of reason. Should Christ have taught by appealing
to reason alone (as Spinoza contends), his preaching would have been ineffective. In fact, if
reason alone does not have sufﬁcient motivational force to bind common people (as both
Spinoza and Locke warrant) it is hard to see how a purely rational preaching could have had
any efﬁcacy. Locke is thus ready to “normalize” the ﬁgure of Christ by presenting him in a
way that perfectly ﬁts Spinoza’s portrait of a biblical prophet like Moses. In Locke’s view the
novelty and necessity of Christ’s coming is sufﬁciently warranted by the new article of faith
according to which “Jesus is the Messiah.” The fact that the New Testament reveals that the
belief in this article might compensate a lack of obedience to the law of works is sufﬁcient to
stress the difference between Christ and the prophets of the Ancient Testament. Consequently,
Locke no longer needs to rely on Christ’s exceptionally rational grasp of the law of nature to
stress his novelty, and can simply emphasize the “reasonableness” of the content of Christ’s teach-
ings. Given the argument concerning both the epistemic and motivational weaknesses of reason,
Locke’s Christ is in fact in a much better position to successfully carry on his mission than Spi-
noza’s Christ.
Scholars stressed how Spinoza’s account of Christ, by insisting on the rationality of the
message he taught, offers a bridge to lead common people from religious superstition to a
purely philosophical grasp of the moral law. Carlos Fraenkel went even further by claiming
that this view of Christ should apply to Biblical prophets as well. According to Fraenkel,
Spinoza himself was in fact ultimately committed to “dogmatism”.85 On the contrary, reading Spi-
noza’s argument from the point of view of his discussion of the weaknesses of reason leads to
appreciating how Christ’s role is rather that of conﬁrming the overall reasonableness of the
message taught by Holy Scripture. Yet, Spinoza’s effort to dismiss any political vindication in
Christ’s preaching and to reduce his role to that of a universal preacher also generates tensions
with Spinoza’s overall discussion of the weaknesses of reason. This is why Locke, in order to
pursue the discussion about the weaknesses of reason, considers it more appropriate to normalize
the ﬁgure of Christ and reduce him to the proﬁle of a Biblical prophet like Moses.
To conclude, the comparison between Locke and Spinoza’s arguments reveals that they use
similar argumentative strategies in order to underscore the weaknesses of reason in both
knowing and motivating human beings to act in accordance with natural law. The main difference
among their views concerns the role of Christ, who Spinoza presents as concerned mainly with the
teaching of “universal religion”, while Locke portrays him as a king commanding a law under the
promise of eternal rewards and the threat of eternal punishments.86 If we accept (as both Spinoza
and Locke do) that reason alone is mostly unable to provide access to moral law and motivate
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human beings to act in accordance with it, then should Christ have preached by appealing to
reason alone, his mission would have been a failure. Locke’s different account of Christ conﬁrms
that no exception should be admitted to the general point already defended by Spinoza concerning
the epistemic and motivational weakness of human reason. From this point of view, even the main
point of disagreement between Locke and Spinoza reveals how they were both committed to
underline the weaknesses of reason.
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1. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 15, sec. 1, 186. Supporters of the dogmatist position would have been Mai-
monides and Spinoza’s own intimate friend Lodewijk Meyer, author of the Philosophia Sacrae Scrip-
turae Interpres (1666). The other position opposed by Spinoza is scepticism, according to which
“reason should be the servant of Scripture” (Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 15, sec. 1, 186). According to
Spinoza, supporters of the sceptic position would have been some Hebrews who tried to react
against Maimonides, as Rabbi Jeuda Al-Fakhar, or more modern Calvinists. On this point, see
Lagrée, Spinoza et le débat religieux, 64–77, who also points out that the distinction between sceptics
and dogmatics can be traced back to the classic doxography of Sextus Empiricus. For a historical dis-
cussion of Spinoza’s polemical targets in the Tractatus, see also Harrisville and Sundberg, The Bible in
Modern Culture; Verbeek, Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise; Nadler, A Book Forged in Hell;
James, Spinoza on Philosophy, 215–28.
2. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 7, sec. 20, 113.
3. See Colie, “Spinoza in England”; Marshall, Resistance, Religion and Responsibility, 454; Hefelbower,
The Relation of John Locke to English Deism.
4. Locke makes explicit that his main polemical target was “deism” in the Second Vindication (published
in 1697). In his introduction to the Clarendon Edition of Locke’s Reasonableness, John Higgins-
Biddle argues that Locke arguably had in mind Uriel Da Costa’s Exemplar Humanae Vitae (written
in 1639 but published only in 1687 by Limbroch) and Toland’s Christianity non Mysterious (1696).
Concerning the historical context of Locke’s Reasonableness and the debate on deism, see Byrne,
Natural Religion, 52–110; Lurbe, “La ‘Reasonableness’ du christianisme.” Concerning Toland’s
complex involvement with deism, see Sullivan, John Toland. The association of Spinoza with
English deism has been studied since the seminal essays by Colie, “Spinoza and the English
Deists” and “Spinoza in England.” Yet, the seventeenth-century English context is particularly rich
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under this label. For a detailed reconstruction of this historical background, see Hutton, British
Philosophy.
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able guide to discover the hidden rationality at the base of Christian religion. See, e.g., Jelles, Preface,
§27 (in Akkerman and Hubbeling, “The Preface”). A deist reading of Spinoza’s philosophy is still at
the root of today’s interpretations of the inﬂuence of Spinoza on “radical Enlightenment” (Israel,
Radical Enlightenment).
6. See, e.g., Balibar, Spinoza and Politics; James, Spinoza on Philosophy.
7. Schouls, Reasoned Freedom, uses this expression to refer to Locke’s position.
8. Concerning Spinoza association with Enlightenment, see, e.g., Israel, Radical Enlightenment and con-
cerning Locke relationship with Enlightenment, see Schouls, Reasoned Freedom.
9. Hoffheimer, “Locke, Spinoza and Political Equality” provides all the fundamental historical and con-
ceptual elements to build the case that Spinoza might have been a likely source of Locke’s egalitarian-
ism. Brown, “Locke as Secret ‘Spinozist’”, reconstructs the historical context of William Carroll’s
charge of Spinozism addressed against Locke’s Essay. Gorham, “Spinoza, Locke and the Limits of Tol-
eration” compares Locke and Spinoza on the issue of political equality and toleration. Klever, “Slocke
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Alias Locke”; and especially “Locke’s Disguised Spinozism” (available at https://huenemanniac.ﬁles.
wordpress.com/2009/01/lockes-disguised-spinozism.pdf) provides the most extensive and detailed
examination of the many passages that appear throughout Locke’s works that seem reminiscent of
Spinoza.
10. This statement is taken from Locke’s third reply to the Bishop of Worcester (1698) and is quoted by
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was among Locke’s targets in the Reasonableness.
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sen, “God, Mixed Modes and Natural Law,” 1117. According to Israelsen, Locke would claim that it is
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Melamed, The Young Spinoza). Concerning how Spinoza’s attitude towards the powers of reason
moved from the optimism of the early writings to a more pessimist view in the Ethics, see Sangiacomo,
“Before the Conatus Doctrine.”
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historical context is offered by Pearson “The Religion of Locke”; Sina, “Il pensiero ﬁlosoﬁco”; Mar-
shall, Locke: Resistance, Religion, Responsibility, 384–451.
17. Locke, Reasonableness, cap. 1, 5.
18. Locke, Reasonableness, cap. 3, 17.
19. In his discussion, Locke uses different expressions to indicate the “law of nature” by calling it some-
times “Morality”, “Law of Mankind” and other similar expressions. In my discussion, I will use mainly
the expression “law of nature”, and I will follow Locke in considering the other expressions as
synonyms.
20. Locke, Reasonableness, cap. 3, 18.
21. Locke, Reasonableness, cap. 3, 19.
22. Locke, Reasonableness, cap. 3, 21.
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43. Seemingly, the same role is attributed to reason also in the Essay. See Helm, “Locke on Faith and
Knowledge”; Snyder, “Faith and Reason in Locke’s Essay”; Wolterstorff, “Locke’s Philosophy of
Religion,” 192; Schneewind, “Locke’s Moral Philosophy,” 217–19; Jolley, Locke: His Philosophical
Thought, 169–93; Jolley, “Locke on Faith and Reason.” Concerning the notion of “reasonableness”
and its evolution across Locke’s works, see Goyard-Fabre, Locke et la raison raisonnable.
44. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 4, sec. 4, 59; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 186. In quoting Spinoza, I use the English trans-
lation provided by Silverthorne and Israel (Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise). After the standard
reference to the chapter and section of the Spinoza, Tractatus, I add the reference to the page number of
the critical edition of the Latin text edited by Fokke Akkerman (Spinoza, Oeuvres, vol. 3).
45. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 4, sec. 6, 61; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 191.
46. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 4, sec. 8–9, 62; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 193–5. In Spinoza, Ethics, part 4, proposition
28 Spinoza demonstrates that the knowledge of God is the mind’s Supreme Good, and in Ethics, part 4,
proposition 37, scholium 1 he relates “religion” to desires and actions based on the knowledge of God.
47. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 4, sec. 12, 65; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 201.
48. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 4, sec. 5, 60;Oeuvres, vol. 3, 188. For a similar view, see Spinoza, Ethics, part
4, proposition 37, scholium 2.
49. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 14, sec. 3, 179; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 468.
50. Cf. e.g., Spinoza, Ethics, part 4, proposition 35, corollary 1.
51. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 7, sec. 4, 99; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 280.
52. This point is well emphasised by James, “Creating Rational Understanding” and Spinoza on Philos-
ophy, 105–10.
53. Locke, Reasonableness, cap. 3, 18.
54. For this use of the passions in the Tractatus, see Sangiacomo, “Spinoza and Relational Autonomy.”
55. Locke, Reasonableness, cap. 14, 157–8.
56. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 5, sec. 14, 76; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 226–8. Even in the Ethics Spinoza sometimes
hints at the fact that the geometrical order of his demonstration may prevent the reader from fully
grasping his views. See, e.g., Spinoza, Ethics, part 4, proposition 18, scholium.
57. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 2, sec. 13, 35; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 127.
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58. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 1, sec. 26, 25; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 106.
59. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 15, sec. 10, 194;Oeuvres, vol. 3, 502; emphasis added). In the Ethics, Spinoza
demonstrates that human beings are necessarily and always subject to passions (Spinoza, Ethics, 4
propositions 3–4) and passions are the main obstacle to act under the guidance of reason (Spinoza,
Ethics, 4 proposition 14–18; Ethics, 4 propositions 34–5).
60. Locke, Reasonableness, cap. 14, 158.
61. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 15, sec. 10, 194; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 502.
62. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 5, sec. 8, 72; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 220.
63. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 4, sec. 5, 60; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 189.
64. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 16, sec. 7, 199; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 514.
65. On this line, see, for instance, Kaplan, “Le salut par l’obeissance”; Touati, “Croyances vrais et
croyances nécessaires”; Brown, “Philosophy and Prophecy”; Dominguez, “La Religion chez
Spinoza”; Elazar, “Spinoza and the Bible”; Halper, “Spinoza and Freedom of Religion”; James,
“Creating Rational Understanding” and Spinoza on Philosophy; Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions.
66. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 16, sec. 3, 196; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 506.
67. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 16, sec. 7, 199; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 514.
68. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 5, sec. 9, 73; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 220.
69. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 5, sec. 10, 74; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 222.
70. This point is developed further in Spinoza, Ethics, part 4, propositions 14–15, Ethics, part 4, prop-
osition 37 scholium 2 and in Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, cap. 2.
71. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 14, sec. 8, 181; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 473.
72. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 14, sec. 10, 183; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 476.
73. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 1, sec. 18, 19; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 92.
74. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 1, sec. 19, 19; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 92.
75. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 4, sec. 10, 64; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 196.
76. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 5, sec. 3, 70; Oeuvres, vol. 3, 212. See also Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 7, 7, and
cap. 8, 11.
77. See Matheron, Le Christ et le Salut, 138. Also Zac, Spinoza et l’interprétation; Laux, Imagination et
Religion, concur on this point. For an overview of the debate on Spinoza’s account of Christ, see
Mauro, “La cristologia di Spinoza”, who also stresses that the major difference between Christ and
any other philosopher is that Christ seems to have immediate access to the knowledge of moral
truth, while for philosophers this is the result of a process.
78. Cohen, Spinoza on State and Religion, vehemently attacks Spinoza for having ignored the universal
nature of the Ancient Hebrew law. However, Spinoza’s discussion of universal moral laws is intended
to show that both the Old and the New Testaments are concerned with it. In fact, Spinoza’s account of
Christ shows that the New Testament is not “new” regarding its content.
79. Bove, “Les raisons de l’échec”, distinguishes between the universality of Christ’s teachings and the
predication of the Apostles (especially Paul), who contributed to turn Christianism in a new form of
religious superstition shaped by the desire for power and political ambition.
80. Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 19.
81. Matheron, Le Christ et le Salut, offers a highly speculative account of the necessity of Christ’s coming
by arguing that Christ would aim to show the possibility of further reappearances of the same individ-
uals in different times (actually, the possibility of reincarnation), which is consistent with Spinoza’s
ontology but not fully demonstrable.
82. It should be noted that this claim is reproduced also in the Ethics (see, e.g., Spinoza, Ethics, 4 prop-
osition 37 scholium 1–2).
83. Locke, Reasonableness, cap. 1, 5.
84. For instance, in Spinoza, Tractatus, cap. 7, sec. 7, Spinoza interprets Christ’s command of “turning the
other cheek” as a restatement of a maxim already introduced by Jeremiah in an analogous socio-pol-
itical circumstance.
85. See Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions, 254–81.
86. Locke, Reasonableness, cap. 12, 122.
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